


THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505



National Intelligence Officers

SP - 144/77
7 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee, Public Statement on The
National Intelligence Estimates - B Team Episode
Concerning Soviet Strategic Capabilities and
Objectives

1. Action Requested: Approval of the attached letter to Senator Stevenson on the draft public Statement. The letter

--confirms that the draft does not require changes to protect sources and methods,

--suggests changes for accuracy and clarity,

--recommends that the Committee reconsider its decision to issue a public Statement.

2. Background: The DCI commented on and made suggestions for changes to the final draft of the classified Committee report (attachment 2). All of the DCI suggestions were not accommodated in the final version of the Committee report (attachment 3).

3. Staff Coordination: The proposed letter to Senator Stevenson has been coordinated with the DDI, the OLC, the Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, IC Staff and the NIO/SP.

4. Recommendation: That you sign the attached letter.

STATINTL

A rectangular box intended for a signature.

Robert R. Bowie

Attachments

-2-

SP - 144/77

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee, Public Statement on The National
Intelligence Estimates - B Team Episode Concerning Soviet
Strategic Capabilities and Objectives

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DDCI

1 - DDI

1 - IC Staff

1 - ER

1 - D/DCI/NI

1 - AD/DCI/NI

1 - OLC

1 - NIO/SP

1 - NIO/RI


STATINTL

STATINTL

NIO/SP: :retyped mat:5721 (7 Jul 77) (initial type 22 Jun 77)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505



18 JUL 1977

The Honorable Adlai E. Stevenson
Chairman
Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dear Senator Stevenson:

The sanitized draft Statement on the Committee's recent report, "The National Intelligence Estimates - B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capabilities and Objectives" has been reviewed as requested in your letter of June 15, 1977. The draft Statement does not require any changes prior to public release in order to protect intelligence methods and sources.

My letter of May 11, 1977 commenting on the classified version of the Committee's draft report, forwarded a number of suggested changes pertaining to accuracy and clarity of the report. Based on these suggestions the following changes are proposed in the unclassified Statement for reasons of accuracy and clarity.

--The penultimate sentence of the paragraph at the top of page 3 can be interpreted as implying DCI concurrence in the Committee Report and public Statement. It is suggested that the sentence be reworded as follows:

"The comments of the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, on the Report and the present Statement were given consideration by the Committee."

--The last sentence of the third paragraph on page 4 of the draft Statement does not accurately describe the role of the DCI in the experiment. It is suggested that the two sentences of this paragraph be revised to read as follows:

"Responding to the PFIAB initiatives, the new DCI, Mr. George Bush, consented to the experiment, and by June 1976, the PFIAB and the DCI had worked out ground rules for a competitive assessment experiment. The DCI, through his representatives, made arrangements for and monitored the experiment in accordance with these ground rules; members of the PFIAB were called upon to assist in the formation of the three B Teams and took an active role in the selection of team members."

--The second paragraph on page 6 of the Statement should make clear that the scope of the NIE did not call for coverage of many of the subjects which the Committee finds were not adequately treated. It is suggested that the third sentence be revised to read as follows:

"Because of its specified purpose and scope, the NIE does not address the question of how Soviet-strategic weapons development fits into the entire panoply of Soviet domestic, military, diplomatic, economic and other world efforts."

--With respect to the findings in the first and last paragraphs on page 7, we have no basis for any implication that political pressures affected the professional work of the B Teams or that the press leaks were attributable to them. Moreover, the last sentence of the first paragraph incorrectly indicates that those responsible for preparation of the NIE were subject to political pressures. This sentence should be changed to read:

STATINTL

"Not all of these requirements obtained in the case of the NIE - B Team exercise."

Yours sincerely



STANSFIELD TURNER

-2-

--The second paragraph on page 6 of the Statement should make clear that the scope of the NIE did not call for coverage of many of the subjects which the Committee finds were not adequately treated. It is suggested that the third sentence be revised to read as follows:

"Because of its specified purpose and scope, the NIE does not address the question of how Soviet strategic weapons development fits into the entire panoply of Soviet domestic, military, diplomatic, economic and other world efforts."

--With respect to the findings in the first and last paragraphs on page 7, we have no basis for any implication that political pressures affected the professional work of the B Teams or that the press leaks were attributable to them. Moreover, the last sentence of the first paragraph incorrectly indicates that those responsible for preparation of the NIE were subject to political pressures. This sentence should be changed to read:

"Not all of these requirements obtained in the case of the NIE - B Team exercise."

Finally, while I have appreciated having the views of the Committee on improving the preparation of national intelligence as conveyed in its classified report, I recommend that the Committee reconsider its decision to issue a public Statement on the report. I realize that at the height of the public controversy about the experiment, former DCI Bush believed it desirable publicly to dispell the concerns conveyed in the press that the experiment had undermined the integrity of the national estimative process. However, the controversy is now muted, and I believe the Statement will serve to stimulate additional tendentious debate on the estimating process, the estimating record and on current substantive issues. Also, some members of the three B-Teams may feel obliged to take public issue with the explicit and implied findings of the Committee that they were subject to or the cause of political pressure or that their views were lacking in objectivity.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

-3-

SP - 150/77

LETTER to Senator Stevenson re sanitized draft Statement on Senate Select
Committee Report

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - DDI

1 - OLC

1 - ER

STATINTL

1 - IC

1 - D/DCI/NI

1 - AD/DCI/NI

1 - NIO/SP

1 - NIO/RI

STATINTL

NIO/SP: :mat/5721 (7Jul77) (orig type 22 Jun 77)

B Team

Flaws:

- Mirror -- imaging -- attributing to Soviets what U.S. would do in same position.
 - misses "grand strategy" and misconstrues way in which Soviets perceive utility of strategic weapons.
- View deterrence as an alternative to a war-fighting capability rather than as complementary to it.
- Soviets do not actively pursue strategic superiority -- want to transfer competition to civilian arena.

Unflagging persistence and patience to favorably mold all aspects of correlation of forces to strengthen themselves and weaken their opponent.

Closely evaluate the evolving correlation and act in accordance.

NIE drafters

- political pressures and considerations
- inter-agency rivalry
- viewing weapons programs in isolation

Team B agreed

- global Soviet hegemony as goal
- concern with China will not deter USSR from aggressive policies in West
- USSR strives for effective strategic superiority in all branches of the military -- including nuclear forces
- reliance on coercion as regular instrument of policy
- SALT etc., perceived as means to more effectively compete with the U.S.

Judgments & their Shortcomings

- Little attention to human source and ♪ to intentions

Critique of NIE Interpretations

B Team Says:

- ICBM/SLBM more ominous, politically and militarily
- fewer or not economic restraints on strategic forces
- strength and viability of civil defense program
- determination to attain war fighting capability
- mobile missiles SS-20 into SS-16
- backfire potential
- ASAT development
- ASW development
- ABM and directed energy interests
- discounting of non-central nuclear systems

Soviet strategic objectives:

- defined as weapons capable of destroying an enemy's capacity to resist
 - economic, political, social and militarily

In broadest sense:

- break up the "capitalist" complement by isolating the U.S. from NATO and the Third World
- undermine further the disintegrating "capitalist" realm by promoting and exploiting such economic, political, and social crisis as may occur in it over time.
- solidify the "socialist" complement and USSR control over it
- contain China
- continue concurrently build up of military forces of such overwhelming might that it could at some point carry out any global missions required by Soviet policies.

Bredth & intensity of military programs
statements by Soviet leaders (internal)
available Soviet literature
growing confidence of Soviet global
behavior

} all indicate
Soviets perceive
that gap bet. long
term hopes and short
term objectives is
closing

Annex -- Strategic Nuclear Forces

LOG NO: 2435

ER
JOANNE

RM

MR

MK

Destroy

CY TO: PAID -atta

STATINTL

SENT : 7/21

FILE : A/B team

NNTC

NOTES: